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COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CIVIL WAR
TALMADGE L. BARTELLE*
When Sunday comes, or times of holiday
Let's talk of fights-there's nothing I like more
Than news of Turkey or lands far away,
Where malcontents have loosed the dogs of war
You stand at the windows with your drop of drink,
And watch the river's colored traffic gliding-
And then when evening comes, go home,
And think how good it is to live in peace abiding.
Goethe, Faust, Part I
The cold war is an expression of the admitted determin-
ation of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend their "inevitable"
world revolution by every available means short of open
war with the Western powers. This includes aiding and
abetting any case of insurgency or civil war that can best
serve communist ends. This determination has caused an
intensification of so-called "wars of liberation." The com-
munists use domestic unrest as a mask to infiltrate into the
political life of a country under the pretext of aiding legiti-
mate national aspirations. They give active military assis-
tance to insurgents but yet label the conflict "internal."
Such conflicts have in reality internationalized civil wars,
and if these wars appear a part of the communist quest for
world domination, the attention of other powers is quite
naturally drawn to them.
The "international civil war" presents certain analogies
to "international war" and produces comparable, if not
greater, suffering, yet only the latter type of conflict is
endowed with elaborate rules for its conduct. This use of
civil wars as a cold war technique has, unfortunately, ex-
posed one of the fundamental weaknesses of international
*Major, United States Army, Judge Advocate General Corps. The opinions
and conclusions expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily
represent the views of either the Judge Advocate General Corps. or any other
governmental agency.
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law For example, international law does not afford effective
protection to victims of such "non-international" conflicts.
Furthermore, the changing concepts of armed conflict and
the participants in such conflict have refused to stay within
the traditional legal and factual framework. This unsatisfac-
tory condition of the law results from a lack of coverage
in the customary and conventional laws of war Article 3,
Geneva Conventions of 1949, has been considered a great
success and a monumental step forward in international law,




A. Communist Intervention in Civil Wars.
On January 6, 1961, Chairman N. S. Krushchev made
the following statement:
Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as
imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists.
These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not
only admissible but inevitable, since the colonialists
do not grant independence voluntarily These
uprisings must not be identified with wars among
states, with local wars, since in these uprisings the
people are fighting for implementation of their rights
of self-determination, for independent social and
national development. These are uprisings against
rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers.
The Communists fully support such just wars and
march in the front rank with the people waging lib-
eration struggle.'
This statement clearly defines the views of the com-
munists toward insurgency and revolution. The types of
1. Address to the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences,
and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the Central Committee of the
CPSU on January 6, 1961. Reprinted as Appendix III of the Hearing Before
the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judictary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 64-65 (1961). This document also contains a detailed analysis
of the speech by Dr. Stefan Possony.
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"revolutionary wars," which have marked the period since
World War II, have been entirely consistent with the Com-
munists' viewpoint. They are quick to label such "wars"
as purely "local" disturbances, yet, in each case, outside
communist assistance has been a significant moving force
in attempting to displace an established government. They
do not come face to face with the government they try to
overthrow Neumann2 has stated that today's revolutions
are international in character, and has said that it is not
always necessary to move across national boundaries in order
to win major conflicts. "A central revolutionary authority,
enforced by the new weapons of psychological warfare, can
direct its orders by remote control through well-established
revolutionary pipelines of the disciplined party within the
border '"
Of primary concern to the communists is the formation
of a mass basis for revolution. To do this, they emphasize
the failures of democratic leadership to satisfy and integrate
large segments of society "In Agrarian societies, especially
where feudalism rules, a discontented peasantry longing for
liberation may also become a staunch supporter of the
revolution. )4
This outside aid need not be in the form of regular
soldiers but more than likely will consist of armed bands
who cross the frontier and act as advisors to the local in-
surgents. Following World War II, the Greek Communists,
advised by Moscow and supported by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria
and Albania,5 began to vie for the control of the govern-
ment of Greece. Greek rebels received war materials and
medical supplies from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,
and were further assisted by broadcasts from a station in
Yugoslavia, and by freedom to come and go across the
frontiers between Greece and its neighbors. Obviously, this
support for the rebels constituted a threat to the political
and territorial integrity of Greece.
In Laos, Communist China and North Vietnam (the latter
2. Neumann, The International Civil War, 1 WORLD POLITICS 333 (1949).
3. Id. at 349.
4. Id. at 345.
5. New York Times, Feb. 5. 1949, p. 2, col. 3.
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owing much of its existence to the former) have activily
assisted the communist rebellion against the Royal Lao
Government.6 There was also substantial Soviet complicity
in this matter 7 This assistance included supplies and mili-
tary weapons.8  In fact, by February, 1962, North Vietna-
mese infiltrators in Laos had grown to 10,000, and consisted
of combat troops, technicians, and advisers. 9
The Communist offensive in South Vietnam had, from
the beginning, received the active assistance of North Viet-
nam 0 and Communist China."
The Hanoi Government's late 1960 decision to
support the Viet Cong uprising virtually coincided
with the fall of eastern Laos to friendly neutralist-
Pathet Lao Forces. Free use of the Laotian corridor
has facilitated the transport of supplies and reinforce-
ments from North Vietnam to the south. By April,
1962 an estimated 16,000 North Vietnamese troops
were believed to be among the guerrillas in South
Vietnam .12
This Communist offensive was directed from outside South
Vietnam and by 1961, the Viet Cong had gained effective
control over substantial portions of South Vietnam.
B. United States Counterintervention.
The United States' response to this communist subversion
of governments occurred early in the cold war and has re-
mained one of the most constant of her foreign policies.
6. 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 519 (1959).
7. "And the fact that the military outbreak in Laos last August followed
conferences in Moscow and Peiping between Soviet, Chinese Communist, and
Viet Minh leaders is added evidence of the Soviet activity in this matter." Id. at
667.
8. Id. at 414.
9. CLUB, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
30 (1962).
10. For a detailed report of the North Vietnamese organization that supports
the communist activities in South Vietnam, see BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEP'T
OF STATE, FAR EASTERN SERIES No. 110, A THREAT TO PEACE, NORTH VIETNAM'S
EFFORT TO CONQUER SOUTH VIETNAM (1961).
11. In April, 1962 it was reported that up to 3,500 Chinese soldiers were
assisting in the training of the North Vietnamese Army. New York Times, April
28, 1962, p. 1, col. 8.
12. CLUBB, supra note 9, at 44. It would seem that these facts would satisfy the
"predominantly external interventions" (quantitative) requirement cited by
Quincy Wright, infra note 110.
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In the interest of resisting the communist subversion in
Greece President Truman announced this policy-
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres-
sure. I believe that we must assist free people to
work out their own destinies in their own way I be-
lieve that our help should be primarily through ec-
nomic and financial aid which is essential to economic
stability and orderly political processes."3
The United States' position was that it had the obligation
to assist the legitimate governments in fights against illegal
outside intervention. Implementing this policy in the Leba-
non crisis President Eisenhower said:
About two months ago a violent insurrection
broke out in Lebanon, particularly along the border
with Syria which with Egypt, forms the United Arab
Republic. This revolt was encouraged and strongly
backed by the official Cairo, Damascus, and Soviet
radios which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic
Language. The insurrection was further supported by
sizeable amounts of arms, ammunition, money and
by personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the
lawful authorities. The avowed purpose of these activi-
ties was to overthrow the legally constituted Govern-
ment of Lebanon. 14
Only at the urgent request of the Lao Government, did
the United States give assistance to the Lao Army to enable
it to cope with the threat posed to that government by the
communist insurgents. In this connection, the U S. Depart-
ment of State released the following statement on August 26,
1959:
Unlike the Sino-Soviet Bloc the United States does
not believe that there should be recourse to the use
of force in resolving this matter However, the Com-
munists have posed their threat to Laos in terms
that require adequate military and police counter-
13. 93 CoNa.. REC. 1981 (1947) (address by President Truman to Joint Session
of Congress, concerning aid to Greece and Turkey).
14. Message to the Congress of the United States, 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 182
(1958).
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measures if that nation's integrity is to be preserv-
ed.
15
In each instance, it is noted that United States assistance
to an established Government was taken as a measure to
counter unlawful subversive intervention by communists from
outside the territory involved. Thus, it is evident that civil
wars since World War II have been more than likely the
result of instigation, assistance, and direction by agencies
from outside the territory in which the conflicts take place,
unlike traditional civil war These facts were not contem-
plated in international law in the classification of civil war
in the traditional sense and in the rights and duties of
participants in such a conflict.
II
TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF CIVIL WARS
A. Belligerency
Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions of
1949,16 by its terms, is applicable to "armed conflict not of
an international character" and binds each party to the con-
flict to apply its provisions where the conflict takes place
in the territory of one of the parties to the Convention.
A discussion of the nature of belligerency is necessary
in order to understand "armed conflict not of an international
character" and insurgency The following factual condi-
tions1 7 must exist before the status of belligerency may be
extended to a revolutionary movement:18
1. Actual hostilities amounting to civil war within a
state.
15. Supra note 6, at 374.
16. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [1956], 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949 [1956], 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [19563, 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [1956], 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365.
17. "Bellingerency is a fact and must be recognized as any other fact." I
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1940).
18. 2 LAUTERJACILT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (7th ed. 1952).
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2. The observance of the rules of warfare by the rn-
surgent forces acting under a responsible authority
3. The occupation, and some measure of orderly admin-
istration, of a substantial portion of the national
territory by the insurgent forces.
4. The practical necessity for other states to define
their attitude to the civil war
To meet the conditions of item 2, above, the insurgent
forces must be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates, have a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance, carry their arms openly, and conduct their op-
erations in accordance with the laws of war 1o They must
also act under the authority of an organization having some
semblence of a government.20
Obligations and Corresponding Benefits.
What then are the legal obligations and corresponding
benefits which are imposed upon attaining the status of
belligerency9 Having thus attained the status of a belliger-
ency, the customary laws of war would apply the same as
if the conflict were between two States. 21 The four Geneva
Conventions of 194922 would also apply in full with respect
to States which are signatories to them, provided that the
opposing belligerent accepts and applies them.2 3 The hos-
tilities then become "international" in character
Requirement of Recognition by Foreign States.
Belligerent rights and duties, however, are not automati-
cally applicable upon satisfying these requirements, because
of the requirement of recognition. While the existence of
19. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 64
(1956).
20. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES 201 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
21. KEITH, WHEATON'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (7th ed. 1944) LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 18, at 371 DEP'T OF THE ARMY. supra note 19 SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PARTICIPANTS IN
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 6 (Dec. 1961).
22. Supra note 16.
23. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18. at 371.
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armed hostilities between two States does not require recog-
nition on the part of foreign States in order to clothe the
opposing parties with the rights and obligations of belliger-
ents, 24  an insurgency may not acquire belligerent rights
binding on foreign States until so recognized by such foreign
States.2 5  The effect of such recognition is that the rebels
are then given an international character in respect to the
rights and duties of legal warfare as regards the recognizing
States.
28
One of the most important effects of the act of recog-
nition is that the recognizing State would be under the
obligations of a neutral State in relation to the government
of the revolutionaries as well as to the legitimate government
against whom the hostilities are directed.
However clear may be the legal distinction between in-
surgency and belligerency, 27 it has become, since the
American Civil War, obscured by the requirement of recog-
nition and the practice of States refusing to grant such recog-
nition. 28  Although there is no legal obligation on foreign
States to extend recognition of belligerency, 29 the recogni-
24. HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 318.
25. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 249. See WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 40 (33d ed. 1940) "The Parent State cannot prescribe the atti-
tude which a foreign State shall assume toward insurgents. It is, on the other
hand, within the competence of the foreign State to determine its own attitude
toward insurgents, so far as this may accord with the laws of humanity and its
obligations to a friendly state. A foreign State has full right to deny to
insurgents the right to exercise any belligerent right toward its subjects, or may
even intern insurgents if they come within its Jusisdiction, as in the case of
Mexican insurgents entering Texas in 1914." See also, The Ambrose Light, 25
Fed. 408 (S.D. N.Y. 1885).
26. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (3rd ed. 1948). This legal recogni-
tion presupposes the existence of the four factual conditions of a belligerency,
discussed above.
27. "The difference between the status of belligerency and that of insur-
gency in relation to foreign States may best be explained in the form of the
proposition that belligerency is a relation giving rise to definite rights and obli-
gations, while insurgency Is not. Insurgency, so far as foreign States are con-
cerned, results from the determination of those states not to recognize the
rebellious party as a belligerent on the ground that there are absent one or
more of the requirements of belligerency LAUTERPACIIT, RECOGNITION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 270 (1947). See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
28. BisHop INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 339 (1953). "In the
past fifty years, however, recognition of belligerency has grown very uncommon,
and was refused by all parties concerned in the case of various civil wars (eag.,
Spain, 1936-39), in which, a century ago, such recognition would have been
expected." Ibid. "Although the United States has been called upon in numerous
instances during the past thirty years to define its policy toward civil conflicts in
varying degrees of intensity in other states, it has in no instance recognized
a state of belligerency in such a civil conflict." HACKWiORTH, supra note 24, at 319.
29. HACKWORTH, supra note 28. "Refusal to recognize belligerent status not-
withstanding the existence of [the requirements of belligerency) must be deemed
contrary to sound principle and precedent." LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 250.
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tion of such status, in cases in which the insurgents meet all
of the requirements of belligerents, would tend to clear up,
to some extent, this obscurity
It can readily be seen that there is a need for the foreign
soldiers participating in counterinsurgency operations to know
the attitude of their government with respect to the conflict
in order that their rights and obligations may become either
fixed or at least the subject of determination. This, of course,
places an antecedent obligation upon their government to
make such a judgment. Foreign States may, however, be
reluctant to extend recognition of belligerency because of
political considerations. Withholding of such recognition is
apparently a convenient means of permitting foreign States
to render military and other assistance in a domestic conflict
to the established government. More important is that it
would deny the right of both the rebels and the established
government to exercise belligerent rights against the with-
holding State. This prerogative is determined by the highest
political authority of the recognizing State."°
Recognition by the Established Government.
Recognition of belligerency of the insurgents by an es-
tablished government is much less likely than recognition by
a foreign State. Such recognition may be a sign of weakness
of that government, and any act which would evidence
weakness would enhance the prestige of the insurgents.
Apart from this consideration, to place internal conflict on
the same legal footing with an international war also brings
about significant changes with respect to the rights and
duties of the parties to the conflict, and between them and
foreign States. These would include the right to visit and
search neutral vessels, the right of capture for breach of
blockade, and more significantly, the right to be treated as
equals in accordance with the laws of war Obviously enough,
such recognition by an established government would be to
the detriment of that government. Therefore, it is to be
expected that an established government would resist such
30. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1897) HACKWORTH, supra note 17,
at 161.
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a change. It is noted that the recognition by foreign States
is not binding on the established government, 31 therefore
that government may disregard the recognition by foreign
States and treat the insurgents, upon capture, in accordance
with its municipal laws.
32
B. Insurgency
Insurgency is a status which does not possess all of the
qualities of a belligerency It differs greatly from warfare
in which regular armies are openly engaged in combat with
the objective of winning control of the State by defeating the
,enemy military forces in the field. Insurgency has as its
objective the winning of control of the State by first winning
,control of the civil population. It is more than likely charac-
terized by armed bands springing up to harass the enemy
within his own lines and then fading back behind the curtain
of the civilian population.
"It nibbles at the foundations of the state, removing the
underpinning by a process of erosion, until the whole struc-
ture crumbles and falls." 33 The very lack of military for-
mality is its main characteristic-peaceful citizens at one
time, guerrilla fighters at another Insurgency is carried on
by both full-time and part-time personnel,3 4 and it may be
said that its effectiveness may be measured, in part, in
terms of the ability of the participants to lead "two lives"
Armed conflict for the control of a government is not
per se a violation of international law 35 Insurgents, then, are
an organized body of men within a state pursuing public
ends by force of arms and temporarily beyond the control
of the established government.3 6 They may not control fixed
31. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 251.
32. Id. at 252. But "recognition of insurgents as belligerents by the estab-
lished government has the effect of placing the relation between that government
and foreign States upon the basis of the international law of war and neutrality."
CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 375.
33. Greenspan, International Law and It's Protection for Participants tit
Unconventional Warfare, 341 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE 31 (1962).
34. GIA, PEOPLE'S WAR PEOPLE'S ARMY 142 (1962) , Rigg, Catalogue of Viet
Cong Violence, Military Review, Dec., 1962, p. 23.
35. HYDE, supra note 20, at 253.
36. WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1910).
1964]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
territory, they may or may not wear a distinctive uniform,
and may not necessarily bear arms openly Does interna-
tional law recognize a status short of belligerency? Are
revolutionists, fighting for the reigns of government, suffi-
ciently well organized to pose an effective resistence to an
established government, to be without rights and obligations
in relationship to the established government or foreign
States?
Recognition of Insurgency
Foreign States, seeking protection of its citizens and
means to prevent its citizens from assisting and giving aid
to the insurgents may find it necessary to admit the fact
of insurgency 37 Further, revolutionary conflict may not
always be isolated as a purely domestic issue and thus may
affect the trade of other States. It therefore may cause a
consideration of whether, and to what extent, neutrality laws
are applicable. 8
Legal Effect of Recognition of Insurgency
Authorities in the field of international law have attached
various rights which may attend a condition of insurgency
upon the recognition thereof by foreign States. It is said that
insurgents may prevent supplies destined for the established
government from abroad from entering the territory 39
Insurgents may requisition the property of foreigners and na-
tionals on the same basis that the established government
has the right. 40  One writer states that recognition of in-
surgency by foreign States entitles the insurgents to all the
rights of belligerents within the territory of the State involved
37. In 1895, the President of the United States recognized the insurgency of
the Cuban revolution against Spain (1895-1898) and admonished all persons to
abstain from any violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, though
not declaring neutrality, as no belligerency had been recognized. 1 MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (1906). In 1897 the United States Supreme
Court, in condemning a vessel which was fitted and armed in the United States
on behalf of Cuban insurgents, held that the neutrality law of the United States
(Act of 1818) was applicable notwithstanding the fact that the insurgents had
not been recognized as a belligerent power. The Three Friends, supra note 30,
at 63.
38. JEssUp, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 53 (1952).
39. But they have no right to visit and search foreign ships on the high seas.
GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 620 (1959).
40. Ibsd.
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and its territorial water 41 Further, it has been suggested
that the exercise by insurgents of the prerogatives of belliger-
ency on the high seas should not be regarded as an act of
piracy by the recognizing government.
4 2
It appears, then, that the act of recognition of insurgency
by foreign States, in itself, carries with it certain obligations
towards the State involved. It may also be an expression
on the part of the recognizing State that insurgents, upon
capture, should not be executed as ordinary criminals.
43
This recognition of the fact of insurgency does not result
m new international obligations for the recognizing state as
would the recognition of belligerency,' although it would
seem to make the execution of some of its domestic laws
more burdensome.
Despite the fact that the legal status of insurgency in
international law appears to be quite controversial 
4  it IS
concluded that civil war clearly invites the interest of foreign
States. Even though the domestic laws of most civil-
ized States declare insurgency to be criminal4 6 it would be
expedient nevertheless to regularize these hostilities when
they have reached major proportions either by recognition
41. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (3rd ed. 1952).
42. HYDE, supra note 20, at 203. Even "acts of insurgents when duly authorized
by those in control of the insurgent movement, if committed in furtherence
thereof, and directed solely against the government sought to be overthrown"
should not be regarded as piratical. Ibid., at 774. See also Powers, Insurgency
and the Law of Nations, 16 JAG J. 59 (May 1962).
43. JESSUp, supra note 38.
44. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 305 (1959) BORCHARD,
FIORE'S INTERNATIONAL LAw CODIFIED 533 (1918). " [T]his Government has
recognized only that there is an armed uprising against the regularly constituted
Government of Mexico which has adopted measures of suppression which seem
now about to be successful. The rebels, therefore, have no international legal
status and it would seem that nationally they stand as illegal groups of armed
men attempting to overthrow their own Government. They are from the
standpoint of legal principle, both international and national, in no better posi-
tion than ordinary outlaws and bandits." Letter from Secretary of State Stim-
son to Counsel Jones, April 10, 1929, in HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 325.
45. SCHWARZENRERGER, supra note 41, at 30.
46. E.g., the Penal Code of Argentina provides: "Anybody who takes up
arms to change the Constitution or to overthrow the national government or
any subdivision thereof shall be punished. " DANFORTH, THE ARGENTINE
PENAL COnE, art. 226 (American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 6, 1963).
See also THE FRENCH PENAL CODE, arts. 209-220 (American Series of Foreign
Penal Codes No. 1, 1960) THE KOREAN PENAL CODE, art. 87 (American Series
of Foreign Penal Codes No. 2, 1960), THE GERMAN PENAL CODE § 80 (American
Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 4, 1961). Treason is the only crime defined
by the United States Constitution. "Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
1964]
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of belligerency, tacit observance of the rules of warfare as
established by customary international law, or by the appli-
cation of appropriate provisions of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949.
47
The international legal significance that has been placed
upon the status of insurgency and its legal effect upon
foreign States is based upon the recognition of such status
by those States. On the other hand, the legal relationship
between insurgents and the established government during
a civil war has not been based upon any considerations of
recognition. In fact, there were no international rules which
governed the relationship between an insurgent group and
the established government. It was not until 1949 that con-
ventional international law gave the status of insurgency a
definite international legal personality For the first time in
conventional international law "armed conflict not of an in-
ternational character," which obviously contemplates condi-
tions of insurgency, became the subject of limited rights and
responsibilities. Certain minimum standards were estab-
lished for the treatment of persons who had taken no active
part or who had surrendered or been rendered hors de combat
during an armed conflict not of an international character
Prior to this time, the Geneva Conventions applied only to
victims of wars between States.
48
III
ARTICLE 3, GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949
Article 3, Geneva Conventions of 1949, by its terms, ap-
plies to "armed conflict not of an international character "
Nowhere in this Article or in the Conventions is an attempt
made to define the circumstances under which Article 3
applies. When does it apply9 To what degree of internal
conflict does it apply'? Who is bound? It is perhaps because
of the vagueness of some of the expressions in the Article
47. The applicable provisions of these Conventions will be the subject of
discussion below.
48. PICTET, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREAT-
MENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 28 (1960).
[VOL. 40
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that one writer said that "a great deal is left to the discretion
of the parties as to when the code comes into operation.
' 49
The article provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an interna-
tional character occurring in the territory of one of
the high contracting parties, each Party in the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostil-
ities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de com-
bat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at anytime and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned per-
sons;
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment pronounc-
ed by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispen-
sable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected
and cared for An impartial humanitarian body, such
as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the Parties to the- conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further en-
deavor to bring into force, by means of special agree-
ments, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall
49. Greenspan, supra note 33, at 41.
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not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
The record of the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference
of Geneva, 1949, reflects that some of the delegates advanced
different conditions upon which the Convention would be
applicable. 90 For example, the French delegate proposed to
limit the application of the Conventions "to the case when
the adverse party possessed an organized military force, an
authority responsible for its acts acting within a determinate
territory and having the means of respecting and insuring
respect for the convention."
The Spanish delegation proposed this condition:
The Conventions should only be applied in cases
where the legal government was obligated to have
recourse to the regular military forces against in-
surgents organized as military and in possession of
a part of the national territory
Australia suggested these conditions: 51
The de lure government had recognized the insur-
gents as belligerents; or
The de jure government had claimed for itself the
rights of a belligerent; or
The de lure government had accorded the insur-
gents recognition as belligerents for the purposes
only of the present Convention; or
The dispute had been admitted to the agenda of the
Security Council or the General Assembly of the
United Nations as being a threat to international
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
The United States proposed the following conditions:
That the insurgents must have an organization pur-
porting to have the characteristics of a State;
That the insurgent civil authority must exercise
de facto authority over persons within a determinate
territory;
That the armed forces must act under the direction
50. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II
B, p. 121.
51. The Australian delegation suggested further that the phrase "non-inter-
national conflict" should not be used, but should be replaced by the terms "civil
war in any part of the home or colonial territory of a Contracting Party."
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of the organized civil authority and be prepared to
observe the ordinary laws of war;
That the insurgent civil authority must agree to be
bound by the provisions of the Convention.
It is readily seen that all of the foregoing proposals
contain elements common to the status of belligerency 52
They all seemed to recognize the danger of weakening the
State when faced with conflicts caused by revolt, banditry
and riot, by requiring it to apply to such conflicts international
rules, which were intended for use in international wars, in
addition to its own domestic laws. It also meant finding in
advance, if and how an international treaty could bind, inside
a country, parties, groups, and provisional governments not
yet in existence.
Fortunately, the idea of attempting to promulgate a strict
rule was abandoned since the discussions of criteria did not
take into account the possibility of armed conflict within a
State which fell short of the factual requirements of a
belligerency" It was, of course, natural for difficulties to
arise, because the signatories to the Conventions are States
but in the event of civil war, one of the parties to the conflict
is normally not a recognized belligerent.5 4 This means then
that Article 3, common to all four of the Geneva Conventions,
imposes obligations upon entities which are not normally
the proper subjects of international law 55 Whereas previously
this respect for human personality as expressed in the Article
had been applied only to military personnel, it is now concern-
ed with individuals whether or not they wear a uniform,
regardless of their allegiance, beliefs, race or any duty their
government might have assumed in their behalf.5 6  Its
purpose is to regulate civil wars and insurrections by
establishing legal obligations to observe certain minimum
52. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18.
53. PICTET, supra note 48, at 35-37.
54. See Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims, 45 Am. JT. INT'L L 462, 466 (1951).
55. Lauterpacht, The Problems of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 362 (1952).
56. Soirdet, The Geneva Conventions and Civil War 3 REV. INTERNATIONAL DE
LA CnOIx-ROUGE 136 (Supp. No. 8, Aug. 1960).
1964]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
standards of conduct for compliance by "each party to the
conflict."
Irrespective of the juridical character of the conflict,
violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds,
torture, outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and de-
grading treatment, taking hostages, and sentencing and
executions prior to a trial affording all the judicial guarantees
recognized as essential by civilized peoples, are expressly
prohibited. The general principle behind these prohibitions is
that those persons taking no part in the hostilities, including
surrendered or captured combatants, wounded and sick5 are
in all circumstances to be treated humanely without dis-
tinction based upon any criteria similar to race, sex, religion,
or wealth. "An impartial humanitarian body may offer
its services to the Parties to the conflict," but the Article
does not place any obligation upon any party to accept such
services. It is also recommended in the Article that the
parties enter into agreements for the application of "all or
part of the other provisions" (of the entire Conventions)
Further, of great significance is that the Article makes it
clear that its application does not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict. This Article has opened a new
dimension in the law of war and has extended considerably
the international obligations of States. 5s
By April, 1962, eighty-seven countries were participating
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 9 Article 3 pertains to almost
all of the armed conflicts of recent years, yet it has been
reported that its provisions have not always been complied
with." France, in the case of Algerian conflict, did not seem
prepared to admit that Article 3 of the Conventions applied
57. The convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in the Field, like Art. 3, also applies to individuals, thereby imposing
international obligations on them. Lauterpacht, supra note. 55. Apparently civil-
lans may be punished for failing to respect the wounded. Art. 18(2) provides,
inter alia The civilian population shall respect these wounded and sick,
and in particular abstain from offering them violence."
58. " the observance of fundamental human rights has, in so far as it
is the subject matter of legal obligations, ceased to be one of exclusive domestic
jurisdiction of States and has become a matter of legitimate concern for the
United Nations and its members." 1 LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAw 740 (7th ed. 1952).
59. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OP THE RED CRoss 203 (1962).
60. Greenspan, supra note 33, at 40.
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to that conflict. She claimed that her participation in the
rebellion, being directed by a small group of revolutionaries,
was "police action", that it was an internal matter, and
that her adversaries were considered common criminals.
6
1
Great Britain, in the Mau-Mau rebellion, imprisoned several
thousands of people without a trial who were accused of
participation in that rebellion.6 2  Red Cross delegates were
refused an armistice to collect the wounded lymg in the
streets during the Hungarian revolt in 1956.13
Traditionally, governments have regarded rebels as
offenders to a degree greater than that of ordinary criminals.
They resent any attempt by outside bodies, including the
Red Cross, to intercede on behalf of rebels.
6 4
As pointed out previously, some States feared that to
apply the entire Convention in a civil war would tie the hands
of the State in applying municipal law to suppress rebellion.
They also thought that employing Article 3 would strengthen
the legal position of the insurgency by giving it the status of
a belligerency 65 By the express terms of the Article, it
guarantees that the legal status of the parties to the conflict
will in no way be affected by its application. Further, in its
form, there is no limitation on the unquestioned right of a
State to put down a rebellion. The requirements of the Article
are those which civilized States would be expected to perform
anyway It is difficult to conceive of a State that would
61. ALGERIAN OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949 TO THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN CONFLICT 12 (1960). (France
ratified the Convention in 1951) Whatever may be said about the organization
of the rebels in Algeria, it is significant that more than forty thousand French
troops were employed. Thus it is difficult to understand their refusal to recognize
that this conflict fell within Art. 3.
62. JOYCE, RED CROSS INTERNATIONAL AND THE STRATEGY OF PEACE 187-188.
(Great Britain had signed the Conventions but had not ratified them) It is
difficult, under the circumstances, to tell whether a detention without trial
is punishment requiring a trial by a regularly constituted court, as contemplated
by Art 3.
63. Id. at 170.
64. At the 19th International Red Cross Conference in 1912 the American
delegation submitted a report on "The Role of The Red Cross in Civil War or
Insurrection." The Russian delegation objected to the discussion, stating the
general principle of the time, that "Red Cross Societies can have no duty to
fulfill with respect to insurgent bands or revolutionaries, whom the laws of
my country cannot regard as otherwise than as criminals." Soirdet, supra note
56, at 138. In 1955 the Red Cross approached the British authorities, requesting
that it be Permitted to perform certain humanitarian functions on behalf of
rebels imprisoned during the Mau-Mau rebellion. Those authorities at first re-
fused, but later relented and permitted visitation. JOYCE, supra note 62, at 187-188.
65. Id. at 63 ALGERIAN OFFICE, supra note 61, at 13.
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contend bef6re world opinion that it has a legal right to
murder, torture, or mutilate, and leave untended wounded
and sick on the ground that such victims are only common
criminals.68
It is to be noted that the acts forbidden by the Article
are those which, committed on a wide scale, would most
deeply shock the public conscience. This in no way impedes
the application of municipal law Even if insurgents are
considered as criminals by the established government, such
government is in no way hindered by the observation of
Article 3. Few, if any, civilized states' legislation authorizes
the application of treatment which Article 3 prohibits, that is,
"tviolence to life and person" and "execution without a trial."
Thus, a non-uniformed member of an insurgent force captured
by the established government during a domestic conflict in
which there has not been a recognition of belligerency is
subject to the municipal laws of such government and may
be prosecuted as an ordinary criminal except that, in addition,
such insurgent would have the basic humanitarian protection
of Article 3. This would still pertain if this insurgent were in
uniform, carried his arms openly, and were a part of an
organized unit. His wearing a uniform would immunize him
from prosecution under municipal law only if there has been
a recognition of belligerency In that case, the customary
laws of war would apply 67 In an international war, a captive
soldier cannot be punished for acts of legitimate warfare
which he has committed against the enemy forces. He can
neither be arraigned for such acts nor be prosecuted by
a court. He has the right of the full application of the Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
Therefore, in internal armed conflict, regardless of what
insurgents are wearing when captured, if there has not been
a recognition of belligerency, the only safeguards to which
they would be entitled as a matter of international law is
66. Yingling and Ginnane stated that "future generations may consider it
a sad commentary on our times that the nations of the world thought it neces-
sary In these Conventions to provide that in case of Internal conflict, murder,
mutilation, torture and other cruel treatment should not be practiced on prisoners
and noncombatants." The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393,
396 (1952).
67. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, aupra note 19, at 9.
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Article 3, and provided the established government is bound
by the Convention.
6 8
It should be noted, however, that should the parties to
the conflict agree to bring into operation all or a part of the
other provisions of the Convention, as provided for in Article
3, the fact that captives are uniformed could result in the
application of the Prisoner of War Convention, provided the
requirements of Article 4 are satisfied.
6 9
The fact that an insurgent was captured in uniform may
encourage a policy of leniency toward him on the part of
his captors on the ground that such a fighter is probably more
chivalrous in conducting warfare than one who clandestinely
foments terror However likely that this may provoke a more
favorable policy, the fact of wearing a uniform does not
constitute a legal basis for a special status to captives in an
armed conflict not of an international character 70
A. When The Article Applies.
There were difficulties during the Conference about the
expression "armed conflict not of an international character"
which, it was considered, would encompass all forms of an-
archy, and banditry if even a small group of individuals
should revolt against the State. 71 At what point should the
suppression of an uprising be regarded as a conflict sufficient
to bring the provisions of the Article into operation? Obvious-
ly enough, every-day crimes, public demonstrations against
duly constituted authority, and police forces in pursuit of
criminals or rioters do not amount to "armed conflict not of
an international character" Furthermore, the very object of
the entire four Conventions, of which Article 3 is but a small
68. See The Geneva Conventions and The Trial of Cuban Prisoners, INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROss 271 (1962).
69. Being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;. having
a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly* con-
ducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, supra note 16,
at 3320.
70. During the French-Algerian conflict, the Algerian rebels complained that
its army met the requirements of Art. 4 of the Prisoners of War Convention,
yet they were tried under French law and placed in penitentiaries. ALGERIAN
OFFICE, supra note 61, at 12.
71. FINAL RECORD, supra note 50, at 129.
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part, is the protection of victims of war In considering the
titles to these Conventions, there is some clue as to when
they apply Two of the Conventions relate to the wounded
and sick forces in the field or at sea. The other two Con-
ventions relate to prisoners of war and civilians in time of war
respectively Accordingly, it would appear that Article 3 would
apply only in circumstances which, without constituting inter-
national war, have all the characteristics of war and produce
similar suffering. In other words, the record reflects that the
delegates to the Conference had in mind non-international
conflicts presenting certain analogies to war, and not the
type police action which happens almost daily in most metro-
politan areas.
72
B. Who is Bound.
Insofar as Article 3 purports to bind "each party to the
conflict" to comply with its provisions, its legal efficacy may
be doubted since from a legal point of view it appears diffi-
cult to bind, by an international Convention, a party not a
signatory and in fact non-existent when the government ac-
cepted for its State the obligations of the convention. This
question was raised during the Conference but little time was
devoted to it, the majority of the delegates considering that
both parties to an internal conflict should be so bound.7 3 The
answer to this question can be based on the contention that
the insurgents are bound because the State, against whom they
rebel, is bound and thus its subjects are bound.7 4  Certainly,
72. Id. at 121.
73. Ibid. In connection with military action by the U.N. on behalf of a
member State, Pictet contends that such State would be responsible for the
treatment of captives and in the event of action by the U.N. in its own name,
the States which had provided military contingents would be responsible jointly.
PIcTET, supra note 48, at 135. Further, in this connection, Secretary-General U
Thant, in a letter to the President of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, stated " I also wish to confirm that UNO insists on its armed forces
in the field applying the principles of these Conventions as scrupulously as possi-
ble. [A] formal provision to this effect has been inscribed in article 44 of
the regulations drawn up by the Secretary-General in accordance with Resolu-
tion 1001 (ES-I) of the General Assembly* the said Article reads as follows
'Respect for the Conventions. The members of the Force are bound
to respect the principles and the spirit of the general international
conventions relative to the conduct of military personnel.
A similar provision will apply to the United Nations Force in the Congo." Re-
ported in COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIx-ROUSE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 3 (Information Notes No. 7.
Dec. 21, 1961).
74. GREENSPAN, supra note 39, at 623-624.
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CIVIL WAR
insurgents who are fighting for the reigns of government should
be bound by some of the obligations of that government.
7 5
The number of States who have signed or acceded to these
conventions indicate that they represent the weight of world
opinion and set forth established law Furthermore, to dis-
tinguish themselves from common criminals, insurgents will
have some reason to respect Article 3.
Regardless of their disposition to obedience, the insurgents
are not given authority to comply with all of the provisions
of Article 3. Paragraph (1) (d) provides that the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without a trial
before a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civil-
ized peoples" is prohibited. But there appears to be no legal
authority which would permit the insurgents to try those per-
sons whom they capture and wish to punish. International
law does not give them the authority to convene a court for
such purposes; and unless the revolution is successful, there
would be no authority of the State.
It is difficult to understand why the official records of
the Diplomatic conference did not discuss the question of
reciprocity; nevertheless, the article is applicable automatic-
ally without any conditions with respect to reciprocal duties.7
Apparently the delegates to the conference did not intend that
the insurgents be authorized to convene a court for the trial
of anyone for any reason. This is indicated from a consider-
ation of the last paragraph of the Article which states that
its application shall not affect the legal status of the parties
to the conflict. This means that there is no recognition by
the established government that the insurgents have author-
ity of any kind.7 7 The important result of this inadequacy
is that members of the established government who violate
the provisions of Article 3 cannot be tried by the insurgents,
75. "If [a rebel party] does not applv [Art. 3], it will prove that those who
regard its action as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are right." PICTET, supra
note 48, at 37-38. Fidel Castro's revolutionary government, once it was in power,
promised the International Red Cross Committee that it would obey Art. 3 of
the Geneva Conventions. The Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1959. See also ComiaTE
INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-RlOUGE, THE ICRC AND THE CONFLICT IN CUBA, (In-
formation Note No. 670b, Jan. 9,. 1959).
76. PICTET, supra note 48, at 35.
77. Id. at 47.
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thus leaving the insurgents without this legal means to en-
force compliance.
Article 3, as we have seen, is concerned with individuals,
regardless of their allegiance or nationality The parties to
the conflict may well include foreigners who are assisting
and advising both the insurgents and the established govern-
ment. However, the Article does not determine the legality
of such assistance. It is concerned solely with the welfare
of the helpless. One must look beyond the Geneva Conven-
tions to make the determination of the legality of intervention
by foreign States. Such intervention concerns the relation-
ship of government to government and not the relations of
captor to captive.
IV
LEGALITY OF INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS
BY FOREIGN STATES
A. On Behalf of Insurgents.
Is it legal for a foreign State to intervene for the pur-
pose of rendering assistance to insurgents? It is generally
understood that giving assistance by a foreign State to in-
surgent forces is prohibited by international law 78 This
position is based upon the propositions that international law
recognizes the right of revolution;7 9 that foreign interven-
tion is necessarily directed against a portion of the popula-
tion of a foreign State, which population has a right to employ
its own resources to acquire the reigns of its government;8o
and, that foreign intervention violates the political integrity
of the State."'
The U N Charter
The Charter of the United Nations provides that the
Members "Shall refrain in their international relations from
78. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 660.
79. HYDE, supra note 20, at 253.
80. Ibtd.
81. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 41, at 44.
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the threat or use of force against the teiritorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.
' '5 2
That foreign intervention for the purpose of rendering assis-
tance on behalf of insurgent forces may also be a violation
of the U N. Charter, is indicated- by the passage of a reso-
lution by the General Assembly on November 17, 1950, as
follows:
[W]hatever the weapons used, any aggression
whether committed openly or by fomenting strife
in the interest of a foreign power, is the gravest of
all crimes against peace and security throughout
the world. 83
As previously noted, the legality of foreign intervention
on behalf of insurgents does not influence the applicability
of the provisions of Article 3 to those foreign soldiers who
may be captives of the established government. Neither does
it determine their legal status vis-a-vis the established gov-
ernment.
Status of Foreign Soldiers Assisting Insurgents.
Article 3, of the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not recog-
nize a distinction between alien and national parties to an
internal conflict. Consequently foreigners, acting on behalf
of insurgents in a private capacity are not entitled to treat-
ment any different upon capture than insurgents who are
nationals of the State. They, like the nationals, would be
subject to prosecution under the domestic laws of such State
except that the humanitarian provisions of Article 3 would
also apply Unless the insurgents were legally entitled to
exercise belligerent rights, foreigners would share the lot of
the insurgents. In 1873 the Americans and British aboard
the ship Virginius, which was employed in aid of the Cuban
insurrection against Spain, were, upon capture on the high
seas by the latter government, taken to Cuba and there con-
82. U.N. CHARTER art 2, para. 4, 59 STAT. 1033, 1037 (1945).
83. U.N. GEN. ASS. OFF. REC. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 13 (A/1775) (1950).
See also Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112,
115 (1959).
1964]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
victed and shot. 4 When the nationals of one State enter
another for private purposes, they subject themselves to the
municipal laws of such other State.8 5 It would not make any
difference whether such foreigners wore the uniforms of the
insurgent or not.
Whether uniformed members of a foreign military force
who are acting under the orders of their government to ren-
der assistance to insurgents would, upon capture, be given
a special status beyond that contemplated by Article 3 would
appear to depend in part upon whether the established govern-
ment and the foreign State would consider that they are at
war with each other If so, such foreign military members
would be entitled to Prisoner of War status as the conflict
would be international in character Otherwise, the establish-
ed government would not necessarily be bound to accord
Prisoner of War status to such captured foreign soldier as-
sisting or advising the insurgents. Should an international
war subsequently develop between those two States because
of the presence and assistance of the foreign forces, then
of course, the international rules pertaining to Prisoners of
War would apply
Another view in this regard is found in a consideration
of Article 2, common to all four, of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. It provides in pertinent part:
the present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.
Commenting upon this Article, Pictet points out that any
difference arising between two states which leads to the inter-
vention of members of the armed forces is an armed con-
flict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the
Parties denies the existence of a state of war 86 Regardless
of whether there has been fighting, and the number of persons
84. HYDE, supra note 20, at 244.
85. HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 84.
86. PICTET, supra note 48, at 23.
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involved, it is enough if such captives fall within the scope
of the criteria for Prisoners of War status.6 7 Thus, under
this view, it appears that uniformed members of a foreign
military force, who are captured while assisting the insur-
gents are to be accorded Prisoner of War status.
8 8
Having established the illegality of foreign intervention
on behalf of the insurgents and discussed the indirect manner
in which communist intervention has been accomplished, it
is considered appropriate to determine the legal means the
established government can employ to defend itself against
such intervention.
Countermeasures By The Established Government
Against Outside Intervention.
What action may an established government of one state
take in the territory of another state against armed bands
who seek a safe haven in and receive supplies from the
territory of such other state?
As previously stated, territorial contiguity with States
friendly to the insurgents provides them with a means of
obtaining arms and supplies and temporary retreat to a safe
haven. The communist insurgents in Greece were able to
operate effectively on its northern border as it was conven-
ient for them to retreat inside the territory of Yugoslavia,
Albania and Bulgaria. In Algeria, the rebels were able to
evade the French army by fading across the border into
Tunisia. In fact, it has been reported that the inability of
the French to intercept arms shipments to the Algerian
rebels from Tunisia and Morocco was one of the reasons for
the failure of the French to obtain a victory The French
estimated that the rebels received 2,000 weapons per month
from Tunisia alone.
8 9
It is not always easy to classify all these actions securely
into one of the categories of international wrongs. They do,
87. Art. 4, supra note 69.
88. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE, THE LEGAL
STATUS OF PARTICIPANTS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 7 (1961).
89. New York Times, Feb. 19, 1958, p. 1, Col. 2.
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however, present a problem because the operations are con-
ducted in situations where there is no legal war 90 There-
fore, numerous treaties contain provisions against permitting
the toleration of, or support to groups concerned with
frontier raiding and interference in the internal affairs of
another State.91 There are also municipal laws which are
designed to prevent breaches of neutrality 92
Under international law a State may not legally per-
mit its inhabitants to conduct a hostile expedition from its
territory against another State with whom it is at peace.
3
The toleration by a State of such an expedition implies
complicity and therefore governmental participation in the
conflict; 94 it may even be regarded as giving assistance to
the hostilities by protecting the persons engaged, and such
State may be said to be an accomplice. This principle is
not attributable to the law of neutrality "It exists whether
the foreign State be at war, or endeavoring to suppress
unrecognized insurgents, or enjoying freedom from any in-
ternal disturbance.
9 5
Measures to be taken to prevent this type of unlawful inter-
vention would of course, depend upon the circumstances.
In cases where the Government, in whose territory the inva-
90. Brownlie, International Law and The Activities of Armed Bands, 7
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 713 (1958).
91. Id. at 719. Art. 1 of the convention signed by certain American republics
at Havana in 1928 in respect to "the duties and rights of states in the event
of civil strife" provides in part. "The contracting states bind themselves to ob-
serve the following rules with regard to civil strife in another one of them
1. To use all means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of
their territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in gathering
elements, crossing the boundary or sailing from their territory for
the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife.
2. To disarm and intern every rebel force crossing their bound-
aries.
3. To forbid the traffic in arms and war material, except when in-
tended for the government, while the belligerency has not been
recognized, in which latter case the rules of neutrality shall be
applied. " 46 STAT. 2750 (1930).
92. E.g., the neutrality Act of 1917 provides "Whoever within the United
States knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or
furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition
or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion
of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony district, or people with whom the
United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both." 40 Stat. 223 (1917), 18 U.S.C. § 960. Note
that this statute apparently does not require that a state of war exist in such
foreign state.
93. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 704 8 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 908 2 HACKWORTH, sup'ra note 17, at 336-342.
94. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 704.
95. HYDE, supra note 20, at 2254.
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sions originate, cannot suppress these armed bands without
assistance, military measures to include a frontier crossing
could be taken with the consent of such Government. 8
In cases where the government in whose territory the
armed bands originate is unwilling to suppress them, it would
appear that Article 51 of the U N. Charter may permit
military action across the frontier as a countermeasure.
This Article provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security
It is not likely that this provision contemplates that negli-
gence by a government in permitting armed bands to oper-
ate from its territory constitutes an "armed attack" within
the meaning of the Article. But it would seem that some
grave breach of the peace or organized invasion by irregulars
ordered by a government may come within the terms of the
Article and consequently permit some preventive action.
And especially so, if there is clear complicity of the govern-
ment of the State from which they operate. 9 7 Do the pro-
visions of Article 51 exclude the right of preventive mea-
sures in situations not amounting to "armed attack", that
is, anticipated armed attack?
The customary rule of international law pertaining to
this area is probably best stated as follows:
Whenever a government lends it countenance
to individuals who are making hostile preparation
within its territory, or even when the government
does no more than fail to fulfill the obligations
which international law imposes upon it to police
its territory and to suppress the fitting out of hostile
expeditions, it becomes responsible for the illicit
acts which it has tolerated or failed to prevent.
96. There was an agreement between the United States and Mexico in
1882 which provided for the crossing of the frontier by the armed forces of
either country in pursuit of hostile Indians. For this and other examples, see
Brownlie, supra note 90, at 730.
97. Id. at 731.
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In this event the state whose security is
threatened has the right to intervene directly by
way of self-help, and remove the menace to its
security 98
This rule had its early origin in the Caroline case, where,
in 1838, Canadian revolutionaries gathered in New York on
the Niagara River awaiting transportation to Canada. The
Canadian Government, as a countermeasure, crossed the
river into New York and suppressed the expedition by burn-
ing the boat, The Caroline, to be used by the insurgents
for transportation to Canada, and killing several of them in
the fight. The United States Secretary of State stated that
if there was a "necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation" preventive self-defense might be
employed.9 Although it may be argued that Article 51 has
restricted the customary rule formulated in the Caroline case,
it has never been so decided. Consequently, it would seem
to be a better view that the customary rule is still a permis-
sible source of legal reference, 0 0 and that Article 51 has
only supplementary thereto. This is especially true since the
"inherent right of self-defense" would appear to be mean-
ingless in the event of an initial nuclear attack or a situa-
tion where the Security Council, because of difficulties among
its members, is unable to take appropriate action under the
Charter It is because of these situations, not contemplated
by the drafters of the Charter,"' that a more liberal exer-
cise of the right of self-defense is clearly indicated.
During the Algerian conflict, French soldiers chased a
band of Algerian rebels from Algeria into Tunisia, whence
they came, and fought a battle in that territory France
claimed this as a right under international law 102 In 1916,
the United States soldiers pursued Villa's bandits from New
Mexico across the Mexican border The United States' posi-
tion was stated as follows:
98. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 373-374 (1921).
99. HYDE, supra note 20, at 239.
100. Brownlie, 8upra note 90, at 732.
101. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 107 (1949).
102. Brownlie, supra note 90.
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If Mexican Indians whom Mexico is bound to
restrain are permitted to cross its border and com-
mit depredations in the United States, they may be
chased across the border and then punished.10,3
This doctrine of "hot pursuit" has been recognized by
authorities on international law when applied on the high
seas,'10 4 and was based upon the right of self-defense in case
of necessity The question which suggests itself is whether
this doctrine has similar applicability on land. 1°0 Obviously
it would be difficult to analogize between the two for the
reason that no State has jurisdiction over international
waters. It would seem, however, that the necessity of self-
defense would be greater on land than at sea, especially in
conflicts such as that previously described in Greece, Laos,
Algeria and Vietnam. Although the Caroline case was not
a genuine case of hot pursuit, the rule formulated in the
Caroline case would probably permit reference to this doc-
trine. Even so, any proposed action taken under this doc-
trine should be weighed against all possible consequences.' 6
To whatever extent the right of self-defense may be
meaningful, the present conflicts in Laos and Vietnam il-
lustrate that a militarily weak nation may be incapable of
effectively exercising such rights to self-defense and, accord-
ingly, cannot hope to survive against insurgents who are
aided by stronger foreign States. Their only chance to survive
may have to be based upon other international legal rights.
Therefore, another means open to the established govern-
ment as a countermeasure against outside intervention is
that of requesting the assistance of a foreign government.
B. On Behalf of the Established Government.
The obvious question in this connection is whether it is
103. 1 WHARTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 230 (2d ed. 1887).
104. Pursuit lawfully commenced in territorial waters and continued without
interruption into international waters. See HYDE, supra note 20, at 794.
105. Text writers make no reference to this question except that 2 HACKWORTH,
supra note 17, at 291, and 1 HYDE, supra note 20, at 240, mention it as it per-
tams to United States practice with the Mexican problem.
106. See Scott, The Amercan Punitive Expedition Into Mexico, 10 AM. J.
INT'L L. 337 (1916).
1964]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
legal for a foreign State to intervene for the purpose of
rendering assistance to the established government.
There is divided authority as to the legality of foreign
intervention on behalf of an established government. One
view, as expressed by many authorities, is that "since inter-
national law recognizes the right of revolution, it cannot




Another view is that foreign States have a legal right
to aid the established government in putting down a revolt. 10 8
The argument on this principle is that if assistance is given
to the legitimate government it is not a case of unlawful
intervention as it would be to give assistance to the insurgents
who are revolting against its lawful authority Consequently,
the determination of whether such assistance is given would
be a matter of policy rather than a matter of right or obli-
gation under international law This argument, of course,
presupposes no recognition of belligerency on the part of
the assisting government. For once there is such recogni-
tion, the foreign State loses its right, which it had during
the period of insurgency, to assist the legitimate govern-
ment and therefore must treat both belligerents alike. 0 9
Thus it appears that international law has no well
defined and clear-cut rules relating to the legality of inter-
vention on behalf of an established government in a civil
war Writers in this area have, for the most part, discussed
intervention from the viewpoint of external forceable action
which would interfere with a State's right to the enjoyment
of full political independence and deny its sovereign exis-
tence without taking into account the "international civil
107. Wright, Subversive Intervention 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 529 (1960)."The proper stand for a foreign State to take in a case of domestic disturbance
within another State can be none other than that of disinterestedness and non-
intervention." CHEN, supra note 32, at 335. " [C]ivil war is entirely permiss-
ible, and to side with the legitimate Government involves intervention in the
internal affairs of that State." Wehberg, Civil War and International Law, in
THE WORLD CRISIS 182 (1938). See also HYDE, supra note 20, at 254, and HALL,
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 293 (1917).
108. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND NOTES 922.
See also Garner, Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31
AM. J. INT'L L. 67 (1937) wherein he stated. "There is no rule of international
law which forbids the government of one state from rendering assistance to the
established legitimate government of another state with a view of enabling it
to suppress an insurrection against its authority."
109. BRIGS, supra note 108, at 992.
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war" Since World War II it has been difficult clearly to
define purely internal conflicts which are completely isolated
from the outside world. The forces of the interior are, in
most cases, stirred up and assisted from the outside. It is
apparent, then, that this distinction would seem to take the
case beyond the law relating to intervention in civil war,
that is, civil war in the traditional sense. The international
civil war, civil war conceived, instigated, assisted and dir-
ected by outside countries, has not been the subject of
distinction by authorities in considering the legality of
"intervention." 110 Accordingly, this very old debate as to
what extent intervention in a civil war may be a violation
of international law would seem to be relevant only in a
purely local conflict. In the international civil war of today
there is an ideological clash, a war of communism versus
democracy, a war where armed bands have a safe haven in,
receive logistical and other assistance from other States.
This type of civil war constitutes a real danger to international
peace." ' It naturally invites the interest of great powers
who are sympathetic to these special points of view Conse-
quently, practice on the matter of intervention has been, and
for some time to come, will be determined more often by
political motives than by legal principles.
In each instance when the United States forces have
entered a foreign State to render assistance to the estab-
lished government, they have done so pursuant to the invi-
tation of that government. It is because of the concept of
sovereignty that a State has complete authority over every-
thing within its boundaries. Consequently, the relationship
between foreign soldiers who enter the territory of another
110. Quincy Wright seems to argue that counter-intervention at the invitation
of the established government may be 3ustified depending upon the actual
quantity of outside intervention. He states "There undoubtedly were propa-
ganda and perhaps military assistance from the outside [in the Lebanon crisis],
but the problem is to determine, as in the Manchurian case in 1931, and the
Chinese case of 1949, whether the movement was predominantly a domestic
revolt or predominantly an external intervention. In order to justify its inter-
vention before the United Nations it would seem incumbent upon the United States
to prove the latter." Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM.
J. INT'L L. 112, 125 (1959).
111. In Vienna in 1961, President Kennedy warned Premier Krushchev that
there could not be too many "wars of liberation" without a direct confrontation
of United States and Soviet power.
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State and that State must be based upon the will of such
State.
Status of Foreign Soldiers Assisting the Established
Government.
The legal relationship between foreign soldiers, whose
government sends them to assist in putting down a rebellion
and the established government is usually established by
treaty 112 Of course, in the absence of a treaty, the municipal
laws of the established government apply to them to the
same extent as they would to the insurgents or other
subjects of the established government. It has become usual,
however, that in instances where the relationship be-
tween United States personnel and the established govern-
ment has been defined by agreement, jurisdiction over such
personnel has been retained by the United States.11
3
On the other hand, foreign soldiers who assist the estab-
lished government in counterinsurgency operations do not
have a legal status different from anyone else when captured
by the insurgents. Article 3 is the only protection such cap-
tives have. The Article is binding upon insurgents to the
same extent as it is upon any other party to the conflict.
11 4
Although there are no geographical limitations upon the
applicability of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
the jurisdiction of a courts-martial does not depend upon
where the offense was committed,"15 certain legal questions
arise with respect to whether United States personnel en-
112. The United States has such agreements with South Vietnam, Lebanon,
and South Korea.
113. (1) The United States courts-martial may exercise exclusive jur-
isdiction over the members of the United States Military Establishment in
Korea. " Treaty on Jurisdiction Over Offenses by United States Forces in
Korea, July 12, 1950, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1408, T.I.A.S. No. 3012. 
"  
The
military authorities of the United States shall have the exclusive right to ex-
ercise all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over all persons subject to its
military law. The United States undertakes to maintain discipline over all such
persons and to insure full respect by them for the laws of Lebanon. '1
Agreement on the Status of United States Forces in Lebanon, Aug. 6, 1958, 10
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2166, T.I.A.S. No. 4387. The Treaty on Mutual Defense Assistance
in Indochina with Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam, Dec. 23, 1950, provides
that officers and enlisted personnel of the United States Army, Navy, and Air
Force will be immune from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the host country. 3
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2756, T.I.A.S. No. 2447.
114. FINAL RECORD, supra note 50, at 121.
115. 5 U.C.M.J. DEPOT OF THE ARMY, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, para. 8 (1951).
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gaged in counterinsurgency operations such as those now
being conducted in Vietnam, can be tried for those offenses
made punishable "in time of war "116 But no attempt will
be made to discuss the legal relationship between the
American soldier and his own government as this subject is
beyond the scope of an article devoted primarily to the
relationship between the harassed Government with its own




Civil wars are the wars of the present, and will likely
be the vehicle for international conflict for some time in
the future. They reflect the development and ferment of the
contemporary world and "constitute the dynamic element of
world affairs today "17 During these conflicts the fighting
is fierce and there are large numbers who suffer as a
result of them. Added to this is the fact that it is difficult
to make a legal distinction between armed forces and the
civilian population in instances where the parties to the
conflict do not recognize a special protective status for each.
An insurgent force is not a sovereign nation, neither
does it possess any other international legal personality
Thus it cannot maintain usual relations with other nations
of the world. It is partly for this reason that the inter-
national rules relating to the conduct of war between States
do not apply to it. Attempts have been made, however, to
formulate some international rules applicable to a state of
insurgency This is a step in the right direction but the
status of insurgency in international law still remains
controversial.
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 has been
considered a great success in the establishment of rules to
116. U.C.M.J. arts. 99-105.
117. Neumann, supra note 2, at 334-335.
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regulate internal conflict, but a close consideration of the
Article shows that it is only a beginning. It stipulates only
a minimum amount of rights. As far as its application is
concerned, it is not clear what is the international responsi-
bility of parties who disregard it, nor whether the penalties
for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are applicable
to violations of this particular Article. Moreover, no manda-
tory international control mechanism exists.
Even though the present development of international
relations makes it difficult to insure that States take action
in this matter, the existence and strengthening of legal
enactments is necessary today to regulate internal conflicts.
Since, as has been noted, internal armed conflicts are
not a purely internal matter for a State, the international
community should express its views in the form of providing
for intervention in humanitarian matters in favor of the
victims of such conflicts.
B. Recommendations.
Arrangements should be made for discussions by quali-
fied individuals and organizations, such as the International
Red Cross, with a view to adopting a draft rule which would
be submitted to States for approval. This rule could be in
the form of a protocol to be annexed to the Geneva Con-
ventions calling for a wider application of the Conventions
to the extent that they will embrace armed conflicts not of
an international character The protocol would provide for
the establishment of an organization within the Red Cross
or other impartial humanitarian body to make a determina-
tion as to when an insurgency has reached the stage of a
de facto belligerency 18 In such cases the protocol would
provide that the Geneva Conventions would apply to the
conflict in full.
The adoption of this measure would provide rules for the
protection of war victims in insurgency civil wars and at
118. De facto belligerencies are not uncommon in recent history. For example,
the French action in Indochina, the conflict between Katanga and the central
Government of the Congo, the Spanish Civil War, and the Civil War in Cuba,
all, at one stage or an~other, reached a de facto belligerency.
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the same time it would not force the recognition of bellig-
erency by foreign States or the established government.
It would also preclude the exercise of belligerent rights by
the parties to the conflict against foreign States and thus
leave the latter's neutrality laws undisturbed. This would,
as a result, permit foreign States to render assistance to an
established government. Further, captives who met the
requirements of Article 4 of the Prisoner of War Convention
would be accorded treatment provided by the Convention.
This would embrace the trial by the insurgents of its captives
in accordance with the laws applicable to members of its
own armed force. 119 Grave breaches of the convention
would then be punishable not only by the State which had
suffered the harm but by other States not involved with
the conflict, 120 thereby affording a control and enforcement
mechanism.
This would solve the problem of the requirement of
recognition of belligerency, which, under the present state
of the law, is a prerequisite to the application of the entire
Conventions.
There would seem to be no reason, humanitarian or
otherwise, to lift insurgency out from under the punitive
provisions of the local law prior to a time when the con-
flict had reached the stage of a de facto belligerency
Governments have the right to protect themselves from
violent overthrow Internal order demands laws against
attacks on the government and its forces. But it is
difficult to imagine that an established government would
be concerned with the prosecution of all insurgents under its
local law where an internal conflict had reached such a
major proportion.
It is conceivable that a revolution within a State, but
inspired and assisted by an outside government, may be
successful. In such a case, the United States may find it
propitious to render assistance to a counterrevolutionary
119. Subject to the conditions of para. 1(d) of Art. 3, supra note 69.
120. Arts. 49 and 50, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded
and Sick in the Field, supra note 16. There are corresponding articles in the
three other Conventions, supra note 16.
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force desirous of regaining control of their former State.
The present status of international law with respect to the
legality of intervention for the purposes of assisting insur-
gents would apparently preclude such intervention by the
United States. This is indeed unfortunate because the legal
objections, that such intervention would violate the political
integrity of the State, is based upon a factual assumption
that there was no prior outside assistance involved in the
conflict. That assumption may have been true in traditional
civil war This being the case, it would seem that the rule
based upon a consideration of facts corresponding to tra-
ditional civil war would be subject to an exception by virtue
of a different set of facts. In other words, if that is the
law as it relates to traditional civil war, does it mean that
this same law applies to the international civil war-one
which is instigated and assisted by other States? This dis-
tinction of facts would certainly indicate a need for a dis-
tinction in law Accordingly, the international law in this
respect should be modified, or clarified.
The civil war is internationalized by virtue of the as-
sistance of outside States. Thus, this modification of the
law relating to intervention could present certain analogies
to the sanction of reprisals in "international war", that is,
retaliatory actions to force the offending party to conform
to the rules of warfare.
It is understood that it would take a considerable amount
of time before these two recommendations could be realized
fully However, there are certain actions that the United
States could take in the furtherance of these objectives.
(1) They should be made a part of the foreign policy of the
United States. (2) The United States should urge their
adoption by the Organization of American States (among
which are some States probably vulnerable to communist
subversion) From time to time this Organization has found
it appropriate to promote their interests by means of treaties,
conventions, resolutions and declarations. The adoption of
these recommended proposals, this writer believes, would be
a significant step forward from what is now an unsatisfactory
state of international law
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Article 3 includes a recommendation that the parties to
the conflict endeavor to bring into force all or a part of the
other provisions of the Convention. The United States should
not adopt a policy urging the application of all of the pro-
visions of the Conventions in an insurgency type of civil
war One of the important problems posed by civil war is
that of converting the insurgent into an ally In fact, the
mission of the United States Special Forces detachment in-
cludes taking appropriate action to cause enemy units to
defect.121 Such action is usually accomplished by an offer
of the established government to grant amnesty to members
of the insurgent forces for taking up arms against the govern-
ment. 12 2 If efforts in bringing into operation all of the pro-
visions of the Conventions are successful, any subsequent
offer of amnesty would not be effective as an inducement to
the insurgents to defect because those insurgents who qual-
ified as Prisoners of War when captured could not be tried
for acts of legitimate warfare against the established govern-
ment by virtue of their new status. Thus the insurgents may
see no advantage in accepting the offer of amnesty, knowing
that they cannot be tried for taking up arms against the
established government, and continue fighting until captured.
Accordingly, any policy adopted with a view to the applica-
tion of all of the Conventions in an insurgency type of civil
war would appear to be unsound.
New Problems call for new solutions. The international
legal questions raised by the conflicts in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere do not fit into any familiar mold; yet they vitally
affect the foreign policy of a nation committed to the rule of
law; and means must be found to update the Law of Nations
to deal with the power realities of the postwar world.
121. Asprey, Special Forces Europe, Army, Jan. 1962, p. 56.
122. E.g., the late President Ngo Dinh Diem offered conditional amnesty to
South Vietnamese who were fighting his government under the communist flag.
-Ie invited all men and women "who have been deceived, exploited or enrolled
by force by the. Communists" to rally to the side of the national Government.
Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 17, 1963, p. 15, col. 2.
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